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KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
CAPITAL PUNISHMENT: A MODEL FOR REFORM
I. INTRODUCTION
I believe that in every man there is some spark of the infinite, some
fragment, however deeply submerged, of the Universal good. If we can
salvage the spark, we must fan it carefully until it flames into usefulness.
I admit that this is not always possible. I have said many times that
there are pathological incorrigibles who must be separated frcm society,
but they must not be separated by killing them in cold blood.1
This statement by Governor Michael V. Di Salle (former Governor of
Ohio) seems to express the feelings of a growing majority of the
population.
The debate continues concerning the issue of capital punishment.
The principal opponents in the debate are those supporting the
theory of rehabilitation and those supporting retribution. On the out-
side, but always a part of the debate, are those primarily concerned
with deterrence and self-preservation.
IH. CArAL PUNISHMIENT
Dr. Thorsten Sellin, the nation's leading criminological statistician,
having compiled a study of the death penalty for the American Law
Institute, divides the two major branches of controversy into the
categories of dogma and utilitarian arguments.2 The arguments for and
against capital punishment vary from those based on theories of
vengeance, retribution and self-defense, to others based on rehabilita-
tion and deterrence, and all may use the Bible3 as support for any
one particular view.
The theory that capital punishment is grounded in vengeance is
invoked on both sides of the debate. On the retention side, it is con-
tended that capital punishment is justified because it is vengeance
and on the other, that capital punishment is unjustified because it is
vengeance. Holmes states:
The first requirement of a sound body of law is that it should correspond
with the actual feelings and demands of the community, whether right
or wrong. If people would gratify the passion for revenge outside the
law, if the law did not help them, the law has no choice but to satisfy
the craving itself, and thus avoid the greater evil of private retribution. 4
1 M. DISALLE, THE PowER on DEAT 214 (1965).2 T. SELiwN, THE DEATH PENALT-z: A REPORT FOR THE MODEL PENAL CODE
PRoJEcT OF THE A.L.I. 26 (1959).
3 Genesis 4:15; 9:6; Leviticus 20:10,17; Matthew 5:38,39; 7:1; Exodus 21:24;
John 8:7; Revelation 13:10; Romans 12:19. See also Exodus 21:12 (King James);
Deuteronomy 19:12,13 (King James). For an example of the extremes to which
Bible quotations have been carried as a justification for capital punishment, see
E. CoxE, INsTrrurEs 211 (1797).4 0'Halloran, Capital Punishment, 29 FED. PROB. 33 (1964).
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But in our own day in India, Krishnainurti, poet and mystic writes:
"If I am brutal and you use brutal methods to overcome me, then you
become brutal like me."5 Returning to the Bible: "Vengeance is
mine," saith the Lord." Since human beings do have instincts impelling
them to seek vengeance, we must consider them; but as most of us
will agree, vengeance is no moral justification for capital punishment,
nor for any other punishment.
The retribution idea is not presently used in debates as much as it
has been in the past,7 but the idea is advocated especially as a justifica-
tion for capital punishment.8Retribution is sometimes advocated by the
opposition to capital punishment when a person has been sentenced to
death and his crime is not one of taking another's life. Thorsten Sellin
has stated: "Retribution seems to be unworkable. It is neither efficient
nor equitably administered. This concept of justice would properly
demand that every person who commits a capital murder should re-
ceive his just desserts."9 He added that all such persons are not
brought to justice; and that when charged parties are brought to trial,
the verdict depends on the skill of the defense lawyer, the sex of the
defendant, and the color of his skin.
As far back as 1764, Beccaria argued that death should not be
meted out according to the social rank of the offender. As one can
see, this problem merits some consideration in light of modem-day
events.10
Most of the utilitarian controversy concerning capital punishment
oscillates around the issue of deterrence." A large number of those
favoring retention believe death imposed for any reason should be
regretted, but they believe that it can be justified because of its value
as a deterrent. But abolitionists argue that the deterrent effect of
capital punishment is a myth. Those favoring retention of the death
penalty state that common sense is convincing evidence that fear of
death is the most effective deterrent. Isolated cases can be cited where
5 Id. at 34.
6 Romans 12:19.
7 In an article written by Richard McGee, Capital Punishment as seen by a
Correctional Administrator, he states that during California's Legislative hearings
on the death penalty, retribution was not considered a very nice word. A witness
seldom advocates the death penalty on grounds of retribution, and when he does,
he is quickly disowned by the other proponents. McGee, Capital Punishment as
seen by a Correctional Administrator, 28 FED. PROB. 11 (1964).8 See 0. SNYDEn AN INTRODUCToIN TO CRmnmqAL JusncE 20-21 (1953);
Snyder, The New Yok Penal Law and Theories of Punishment, 21 BRoon.YN L.
REV. 12, 15 (1954).
9 Sellin, Capital Punishment, 8 CRim. L. Q. 36 (1935).
10 C. MA0SMO, VOLTAIRE AND BECCARTA As REFoRMERs or CRnvrINAL LAW
61 (1942).11 Comment, Capital Punishment, 29 Tm. L. REv. 534 (1962).
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a thief carried no weapon so that he would not be tempted to use it
in making his escape; where a criminal has submitted to arrest rather
than resist with a weapon; or where a criminal has moved to an
abolition state in order to carry out a capital crime.12 In all three cases,
the offenders admitted that it was fear of the death penalty which
caused their actions. The abolitionists argue that these cases are few
and far between, and that isolated cases can also be cited to prove
that the death penalty is encouraging capital crimes. There have been
cases where criminals murdered solely because of their fear of com-
mitting suicide, thereby allowing the state to overcome that fear.13
Turning from isolated examples, because of the offsetting tendency
of such examples, one must now examine the statistics. Dr. Thorsten
Sellin has conclusively shown that no statistical evidence proves
capital punishment to be a more effective deterrent than other avail-
able deterrent sanctions. 14 A conclusion that "the figures afford no
reliable evidence one way or the other"15 is also justified and not
surprising. "Murder is a complex sociological phenomenon"; 16 "A
number of factors-ethnic, general cultural and perhaps economic-
enter as determinants into the production of the phenomenon which is
designated by the simple word 'murder' or 'homicide': It is not easy
to isolate any one of the determinants and assess its role in the
causation or inhibition of homicidal trends"17 and "it is almost impos-
sible to draw comparisons between different countries."' 8 It is also
difficult to draw comparisons between different states. Statistics show
that abolition states generally have lower per capita homicide rates
12 Gerstein, A Prosecutor Looks at Capital Punishment, 51 J. Canm. L. C.& P.S.
252, 254 (1961).1 3 ROYAL COMIMvSSION ON CAPITAL PUNISMNTo REPORT 338 (1949-1953).
However, Dr. Melitta Schmidelberg has recently made the following statement in
rebuttal:
The assumption that offenders break the law because of an unconscious
wish for punishment seems to me unsubstantiated and too general an
explanation. It would, however, even if correct, be no argument to abolish
punishment or even to avoid it in the individual offender. Punishment
may not deter. If there is efficient law enforcement and a belief in justice,
mostly it does.
Dr. Schmidelberg is Director of Clinical Services for the association for the
Psychiatric Treatment of Offenders (APTO), New York, and Medical Advisor for
the Board of Corrections of New York City. Dr. Schmidelberg is also co-editor or
the APTO Journal, a member of the International Board of Editors of ExcxarrA
CRuVMNOLOGICA and Associate Editor of ARcmHvEs OF CRnvmAL PsYcHo-DYNAncs;
See also Schmidelber, The Offenders Attitude Toward Punishment, F1 J. Cmr.
L.C.&P.S. 328, 334 (1961).
14 Sellin, supra notz 2.1 5 ROYAL COrae'N ON CAPrrAI PumsmmT REPORT 18, 24 (1949-1953).
16 H. WEIHOFEN, THE URG To PUmsH 165 (1956).
17 G. ZILBOORG, ThE PsYcHOLoGY OF THE CRIumNAL Aar AND PU NISmINT 29(1954).18 ROYAL CoMnM', supra note 15, at 22.
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than death penalty states.' 9 In the past twenty years, five of eight
states in this country with the lowest incidence of murder were
abolition states.2° Opponents also point out that Georgia is a state
which has the highest homicide rate in the nation despite the fact
that it also has the highest execution rate.
The trouble with analysis and comparison of statistics as to variable
rates of homicide in jurisdictions with and without capital punishment,
or with homicide rates in the same jurisdictions during periods of
retention and abolition, is that there are no statistics to indicate how
many persons, entertaining thoughts of committing murder, were
deterred by fear of a possible death penalty. However, most people
would agree that the deterrent effect of a penalty depends upon the
certainty of its execution (infliction). In "most countries where capital
punishment has been abolished, statutory abolition has come after a
long period when the death penalty was in abeyance;" 21 and where the
death penalty has been retained, it has been indifferently enforced.22 I
suggest that this same trend prevails in this country.
Another aspect which must be considered is that statistics have
"for the most part been assembled by those who would abolish the
death penalty; their object has been to disprove the deterrent value
claimed for that punishment."23 Therefore, the conclusion, "that the
figures afford no reliable evidence either way," is at the very least,
eminently fair, if not generous to the opponents of capital punish-
ment.24 It was also stated in the Report of The Royal Commission that
from the evidence, "it is impossible to arrive confidently at firm con-
clusions about the deterrent effect of the death penalty,"2 and also
that "[c]apital punishment has obviously failed when a murder is
committed." 20 Its failures can be numbered, but its successes cannot.
As previously stated, no one knows how many people have refrained
from murder because of fear of the death penalty.27
19 284 ANNAu 57 (1952).
20 H. WEiOFEN, supra note 16, at 149.
21oy AL Coamid'N, supra note 15, at 23.2 2 H. WEmoFEN, supra note 16, at 165.
23 OyAL COmt'N, supra note 15 at 22.24 Snyder, Capital Punishment: The Moral Issue, 63 W. VA. L. EEv. 99
(1961).
25 RoY L CONMI'N, supra note 15, at 24.
26 Id.
27 Id. at 21. See also the statement made by Judge Hyman Barshay of New
York:
The death penalty is a warning, just like a lighthouse throwing its beam
out to sea. We hear about the shipwrecks, but we do not hear about the
ships that the lighthouse guides safely on their way. We do not have
proof cf the number of ships it saves, but we do not tear the lighthouse
down. ABA SECToN ON CmuNAL LAw PRocEEDNTcs, 14 (1959).
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Although the precept establishing the British Royal Commission on
Capital Punishment directed it to report only on whether liability
under criminal law in Great Britain to suffer capital punishment for
murder should be limited or modified, rather than completely abolish-
ed, the Commission stated:
The general conclusion which we reach, after careful review of all
the evidence we have been able to obtain as to the deterrent effect of
capital punishment, may be stated as follows. Prima facie the penalty of
death is likely to have stronger effect as a deterrent to normal beings
than any other form of punishment and there is some evidence (though
no convincing statistical evidence) that this is in fact so. 28
After considering these surveys and case studies, I think it can be
conceded that capital punishment does act as a deterrent, but the real
question is whether capital punishment is more of a deterrent and
protects the community better than its alternatives.
III. ALTERNATIVES
Much of the debate on capital punishment in the United States
centers on the question of alternative sanctions. Life imprisonment is
usually considered an alternative to capital punishment. One of the
objections to life imprisonment is that condemned murders will be-
come a discipline problem in prison. However, studies indicate that
murderers are the best behaved class of prisoner,29 and that murderers
are also as capable of reform as any class of criminals.8 0
Economic objections have also been raised against life imprison-
ment as an alternative to the death penalty. "Why support some
murderer for the rest of his life when we could execute him and save
all that money," the argument goes. It has been estimated that the cost
to society for the support of a convict is $1200 per year,31 although
some authorities estimate that the figure may be as high as $1800.32
Running contra to this argument is a statement by a correctional ad-
ministrator; "the actual costs of execution, the cost of operating the
2 8 RoYAL CoMa'N, supra note 15, at 24.
29PA. GEN. AsSEAMLY, REP. OF THE Jonrr LEGrsLATv Coma'N ON CAPrrAL
Pusismmrr 17 (1961); T. SEnLRuN, THE DEATH PNALT: A REFORT FORTH
MODEL PENAL CODE PROjEcT OF Trn A.L.I. 70 (1959). Richard McGee, Adminis-
trator for the California Youth and Adult Corrections Agency points out that
experience shows that it is not the life-term prisoner who kills prison officers or
inmates. McGee, Capital Punishment as Seen by a Correctional Administrator,
28 FED. PROB. 11 (1964).
3 0 RoYAL ComM'N, supra note 15.81 Rigg, A Penalty Worse Than Death, SAT. EVE-ING PosT, Aug. 31, 1957, at
13.
32 PA. GEu. ASSEmBLY, supra note 29, at 12.
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super-maximum security condemned unit, the years spent by in-
mates in condemned status, and a pro-rata share of top level prison
officials' time spent in administering the unit add up to a cost sub-
stantially greater than the cost to retain them in prison the rest of
their lives."33 Not to be overlooked is the fact that convicts could be
placed in eritical areas to perform useful labor for the state,34 or they
might be farmed out on a cooperative system to earn wages which
could be applied as compensation to the victim's family.35 We must also
consider the longer trials, the sanity proceedings, and the cost of the
appeals. To single out one example, the Chessman trials cost the tax-
payers of California an estimated $500,000.36
Another reason why people who favor capital punishment will not
accept life imprisonment as an alternative, is because criminals so
sentenced rarely serve their terms in the entirety. Therefore, parole is
something that must be considered. Penologists feel that parole is an
essential corollary to life imprisonment; for without it, lifers would
indeed pose quite a problem for the prison officials. 37 If reform is the
purpose of the prison system today, it would be useless to reform
someone if there is no chance for him to be sent back into society. 38
There is a conflict of opinion as to the amount of time that a lifer
should be required to serve before becoming eligible for parole. Some
authorities have recommended between ten and fifteen years as a
maximum.39 In testimony before the Royal Commission, it was pointed
out that a person should not be detained longer than twenty years
unless he is found to be incapable of correction, because after that
period of time he deteriorates mentally and physically as a result of his
estrangement from society.4
The main objection to parole is that the paroled offenders will be a
danger to the public. Ohio found that of the 169 paroled first-degree
murderers sentenced to life since 1945, only two have been sent to
the penitentiary for new offenses, one for armed robbery and the other
for assault with intent to commit a felony.41 New York found that only
two of the thirty-six lifers paroled since 1943 have committed any in-
fractions, one being a technical violation and the other burglary. Most
33 McGee, supra note 29.
34 T. S.ELmi, supra not-- 2, at 18.35 RoYAL Co-Aa', supra note 15, at 223.36 PA. GEN. AsSEMBLY, supra note 29, at 12.3 7 Comment, Capital Punishment, 29 TENN. L. REv. 534 (1962).38 R. SAL-LES, THE INDIVmUAiUZATION OF PuNismmrrr 193 (1911).
39 Rigg, supra note 31, at 14.4 0 RoYAL COMMN, supra note 15, at 230.41 Omo LEGIS&rvE SnIv. Coma'N, Cr.rrAL PuNIsmvmNT 81 (1961).
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of the thirty-six were to have been executed had they not received
commutations. 42 California, 43 Wisconsin44 and Michigan 45 have had
similar results. The Royal Commission added this statement: "The
evidence seems conclusive that the release of life-sentence prisoners
involves little risk at present."46 It is interesting to note that the
Royal Commission did not recommend abolition and Parliament
amended the laws along this line.
IV. CoNsTrruroNA_ ALAu Trs
In addition to the arguments previously discussed, there is the
continuing effort to convince the Supreme Court that capital statutes
in states which give sentencing discretion to the jury are unconsti-
tutional under the Federal Constitution. In a recent article,47 it was
noted:
Given appropriate supporting arguments, the courts conceivably could
conclude that: (a) Any attempt to "deprive" a person of his "life" in-
volves a violation of "due process of law" (fifth and fourteenth amend-
ments); (b) it is not possible to try a defendant by an "impartial jury"
where the death sentence is involved (sixth amendment); (c) the death
penalty is a "cruel and unusual punishment" (eighth amendment); (d)
the death sentence violates "certain rights . . .retained by the people"
(ninth amendment); (e) anyone sentenced to death has been denied
"equal protection of the laws" (fourteenth amendment).
The argument concerning the "impartial jury" has been weakened
by a recent Supreme Court decision,4 which bars the death penalty
where persons with scruples against capital punishment are auto-
matically excluded from a jury by a challenge for cause. But the Court
also stated: "We simply cannot conclude, either on the basis of the
record now before us or as a matter of judicial notice, that the ex-
clusion of jurors opposed to capital punishment results in an un-
representative jury on the issue of guilt or substantially increases the
risk of conviction."49 The Court stated also that if the state had ex-
cluded only those prospective jurors who stated in advance of trial that
they would not even consider returning a verdict of death, it could
argue that the resulting jury was simply "neutral" with respect to
42 Id. at 82.
43 Bigg, supra note 31, at 14.4 4 Omo LEGISLATIVE SE-v. COMe'N, supra note 41.
45 Id.46 RoYAL COMM'N, supra note 15, at 229.
47 Bedau, The Courts, the Constitution, and Capital Punishment, UTAH L.
Bxv. 201 (1968).48 Witherspoon v. State of Il., - U.S. -, 88 S. Ct. 1770 (1968).
49 Id.
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penalty. But when it swept from the jury all who expressed con-
scientious or religious scruples against capital punishment and all who
opposed it in principle, the state crossed the line of neutrality.50
Most of the other arguments seem unlikely to achieve ultimate suc-
cess, but the "cruel and unusual punishment" argument seems to have
the best possibility.51 However, the most recent word from the Supreme
Court is far from encouraging: "The death penalty has been employed
throughout our history; and, in a day when it is still widely accepted,
it cannot be said to violate the Constitutional concept of cruelty."52 In
short, not a single death penalty statute, not a single statutorily im-
posed mode of execution, not a single attempted execution has ever
been held by any court to be "cruel and unusual punishment" under
any state or federal constitution. Nothing less than a mightly counter-
thrust would appear to be enough to alter the direction of these
decisions.53 As one federal court put it some years ago, "The fixing
of penalties for crimes is a legislative function. What constitutes an
adequate penalty is a matter of legislative judgment and discretion, and
the courts will not intervene therewith unless the penalty prescribed
is clearly and manifestly cruel and unusual."54 A recent writer con-
cluded his discussion of the problem: "In light of these difficulties and
the uniform authority sustaining capital punishment, to hold that it is
a method of punishment wholly prohibited by the eighth amendment
would be to confuse possible legislative desirability with constitutional
requirements."'5
V. LEGIsLATVE AcroN
It appears that opposition to what opponents of capital punish-
ment call "legalized murder" has been growing steadily in the United
States, and polls now show that more Americans-47 percent-favor
50 In its quest for a jury capable of imposing the death penalty, the state
produced a jury uncommonly willing to condemn a man to die ...
the jury that imposed or recommended it was chosen by excluding
veniremen for cause simply because they voiced general objections to
the death penalty or expressed conscientious or religious scruples against
its infliction. No defendant can constitutionally be put to death at the
hands of a tribunal so selected. Id. at 1776.
51 Temain attempt to develop such an argument is made by Gottlieb,
Testing the Death Penalty, 34 S. CAL.. L. REv. 268 (1961), and also in his
subsequent booklet, G. CorrLiEB, CArrA1. PuNisHmvr (1967).
52 Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 99 (1958).
5 3 Bedau, supra note 47, at 201.54 Bailey v. U.S., 74 F.2d 451, 452-453 (10th Cir. 1934).
55 Note, The Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause and the Substantive
Criminal Law, 79 HAIv. L. RE~v. 635, 639 (1966).
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the end of capital punishment than want to retain it--42 percent50
This is a significant change from the Gallup poll in 1953 which showed
69 percent of the population in favor of capital punishment. Most of
the nation's governors and former governors are on record as being
opposed to capital punishment.57
The proponents of capital punishment among prominent Americans
are scarce.58 Among the few are Governor Ronald Reagan of Cali-
fornia and F.B.I. Director J. Edgar Hoover who says: "To 'love thy
neighbor' is to protect him; capital punishment acts as at least one wall
to afford God's children protection."59
Some state legislatures have been giving legal voice and weight to
the prevailing public view. Since 1962, six states have abolished or
virtually abolished capital punishment. In 1963, Michigan repealed the
death penalty for its only remaining capital crime, treason. Oregon
and Iowa completely abolished the death penalty in 1964, as did Ver-
mont and West Virginia in 1965. Also in 1965, New York repealed the
death penalty except for the murder of an on-duty peace officer, or a
killing by a long-term prisoner. This brings the total of abolition states
to thirteen.60
More significant than the statutory abolition of capital punishment
in the various states has been the de facto abolition in terms of re-
duced number of executions. Since 1935, when a record 199 persons
were put to death, executions have been declining steadily almost to
the point of disuse. For the United States as a whole, the number of
executions has been as follows over the last eight years: 1962:47;
1963:21; 1964:15; 1965:7; 1966:1 (Oklahoma); 1967:2 (California,
Colorado); 1968:0; 1969:0 (to date; Richard Speck has been sentenced
to death, but has not been executed as of this date). The last execution
in Kentucky was in 1962 when Kelly Moss was electrocuted at Eddy-
ville penitentiary. Recently, at the close of Kentucky Governor Ed-
ward T. Breathitt's administration, December 12, 1967, he spared the
lives of three convicted murderers by commuting their death sen-
tences to life imprisonment. He also gave three other prisoners stays
of execution-one for three years and two others for five years.
In February of 1966, the Kentucky State Legislature overwhelm-
ingly defeated a bill to abolish capital punishment. During the 1970
56 N.Y. Times, July 7, 1968, at 12, col 1.
57 Id.
58 Id.
59 Id.60 In addition to the six states listed above, Alaska, Delaware, Hawaii, Maine,
Minnesota, Wisconsin, North Dakota, and Rhode Island have abolished the death
penalty. (New York is not considered a total abolition state since it has retained
the death penalty in some situations).
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term of the Legislature, when that body is considering the proposal
by the state Crime Commission, the question of the abolition of
capital punishment should be examined. The Crime Commission did
not propose any changes in jury sentencing in capital cases, although
they did recommend abolition of jury sentencing in non-capital cases.
VI. BintmcA= TmL
The Legislature should retain capital punishment, but in doing so,
they should follow the lead of four other states, which have introduced
a bifurcated proceeding for the imposition of capital punishment. In
California by statute of 1957,61 in Pennsylvania by statute of 1959,62 in
Connecticut by statute of 1963, 63 and in New York by statute of 1963,"s
a new trial stage was added to proceedings in capital cases. After the
trial on the issue of the defendant's guilt for the capital offense
charged, ending with a unanimous jury verdict of guilty, the second
trial stage begins before the same jury "as promptly as practicable." 5
Assuming the retention of the death penalty as an alternative in
certain classes of offenses, the separation of the determination of
punishment from the determination of guilt is a first step in imple-
menting the goal of imposing a socially useful punishment in each
case.(' There are two goals to be attained by the use of the bifurcated
trial procedure: (1) avoiding prejudice to the defendant on the issue
of guilt, since evidence relevant solely to punishment will not be al-
lowed until guilt has been established; (2) allowing an extensive in-
quiry into defendant's background and character and the circum-
stances of his crime to provide a basis for an informed selection of
penalty, thus terminating the purely retributive basis for arriving at
the sentence. 67
It would be beneficial now to consider the differences in the
bifurcated trial statutes. In the following analysis, reference will be
made, where pertinent, to the death-penalty provisions of California,"8
Pennsylvania, 69 Connecticut, 70 New York,71 and the Model Penal
Code.72 California and Pennsylvania provide the most useful guide-
61 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West 1957).
02 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (1959).63 CONN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 939-53.10 (1963).
64 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1045-a (McKinney 1967).
65 Id.
66 Note, The California Penalty Trial, 52 CAIn. L. REv. 386 (1964).
67 Id.
68 CAL. PErNAL CODE § 190 (West 1957).
6 9 PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18. 9 4701 (1963).
70 CoNN. GEN. STAT. REv. § 939-53.10 (1963).
71 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 1045-a (McKinney 1967).72 MODEL PNAL CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
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lines since their statutes have been in existence for some time; and in
California, there is a significant body of interpretive case law.
All the statutes with the exception of New York permit the trial
court to impose the death sentence under a plea of guilty 3 In New
York, if the plea of guilty is accepted, the defendant automatically re-
ceives life imprisonment under a mandate that no individual shall
have the power to impose the death penalty.74
In California, if the trial on the issue of guilt has been conducted
before a court without a jury, the trial judge determines the sentence 5
However, if the defendant pleads guilty, the second trial is before a
jury; but if the jury is waived, the court may impose either life im-
prisonment or death.76 The punishment is to be decided by the jury
in all other cases except where the defendant was under eighteen years
of age at the time of the crime, in which case the statute dictates life
imprisonment. 77
In New York, after a jury returns a verdict of guilty, the trial court
may decree life imprisonment if it should find that "the sentence of
death is not warranted because of substantial mitigating circum-
stances."78 In using this method, New York differs from Pennsylvania
and Connecticut and adopts a procedure similar to the one advocated
by the Model Penal Code.79 This would appear to have the practical
effect of saving the time and expense of an unnecessary second trial,
since facts sufficient to warrant a directed verdict of life imprisonment
by a judge would probably lead a jury to impose the same sentence; 0
but the judge and jury are deprived of the consideration of any ag-
gravating circumstances. The Model Penal Code allows the judge to
prevent imposition of the death penalty only after all the aggravating
78 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West 1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701
(1959); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 939-53.10 (1963); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1045-a
(McKinney 1967); MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
74 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1045-a (McKinney 1967).
75 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West 1957).
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1045-a (McKinney 1967).
79 MDLPENAL CODE: § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Under the
Model Penal Code, the jury, upon evidence submitted at a separate trial on the
issue of penalty, first determines whether the punishment should be life or death.
If the verdict is the latter, the concurrence of the court is required before the
death sentence can be imposed. Id. at § 210.6(2). In California, the concept of
absolute discretion in the jury has been held not to affect the statutory power of
the trial court to reduce the punishment in lieu of ordering a new trial. (CAL.
PENAL CODE § 1181 (West 1957). The vigorous use by the judge of the power
to reduce the penalty is undoubtedly the most effective control of arbitrary action
by the jury. See Note, The California Penalty Trial, 52 CALIF. L. REv. 386(1964).80 Note, The Two-Trial System in Capital Cases, 39 N.Y.U.L. REv. 50 (1964).
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circumstances have been brought out in the penalty trial.81 The ap-
proach taken by the Model Penal Code seems to provide for the
ultimate goal of a more rational determination of the death sentence.
It is recognized that for the jury to intelligently use these alternative
penalty statutes, it must have the same type of evidence before it that
a judge or agency has in non-capital cases.82 In states, other than the
four which have enacted the bifurcated trial procedure, the jury is
required to determine in a single proceeding, both the guilt or in-
nocence of the accused and the punishment to be imposed. 3 Since
evidence relevant solely to punishment would, if admitted, probably in-
fluence the verdict on the guilt issue, evidence of the habits and back-
ground of the accused is generally held inadmissible in a single trial
situation.84 Therefore, evidence presented to the jury for the deter-
mination of the penalty is restricted to that otherwise admissible on the
issue of guilt.85
The bifurcated trial procedure is designed so that the jury will not
be deprived of evidence that is admittedly relevant to the punishment.
With the issues of guilt and punishment separated, there is no longer
a reason for excluding this background evidence.8 6 Where there is a
second trial in California, the statute permits evidence ". . . . of the
circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, of the de-
fendant's background and history, and of any facts in aggravation or
mitigation of the penalty."87 By looking at the statute, it is obvious
that there are no statutory limitations on the admissibiliy of evidence
in the penalty trial, the legislature apparently having intended that
judicial discretion should determine evidence admitted in each case.88
Since the sole issue is life or death, the scope of relevant inquiry is
very broad, but in order to provide for expeditious judicial administra-
tion and to avoid prejudice to the convicted defendant, that inquiry is
not unlimited. California statute § 190.1 has been construed as allowing
81 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).8 2 See, e.g., ROYAL Coxn'N ON CAPrrAL PISwMVENT REPORT 194-207
(1953); Knowlton, Problems of Jury Discretion in Capital Cases, 101 U. PA. L.
REv. 1099 (1953).8 3 Handler, Background Evidence in Murder Cases, 51 J. Canm. L.C.& P.S.
317 (1961).84 There have been instances in other jurisdictions where evidence relevant
solely to punishment has been admitted, but no single-verdict jurisdiction has a
consistent policy of admission. See Handler, supra note 83.
85 See, e.g., State v. Mount, 30 N.J. 195, 152 A.2d 243 (1959).
86 Note, The California Penalty Trial, supra note 66.
87 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West 1957); See also PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18,
§ 4701 (1959); CONN. GEN. STAT. REV. § 939-53.10 (1963); N.Y. PENAL LAw
§ 1045-a (McKinney 1967).
88 Note, The California Penalty Trial, supra note 66.
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only "competent" evidence to be presented to a jury.89 The rule in
New York is different since its statute provides in part: "Any relevant
evidence, not legally privileged shall be received regardless of its
admissibility under the exclusionary rules of evidence." 90
When otherwise "competent" evidence is involved, there is the
problem of determining its relevancy. The same balancing technique is
used in the penalty trial as in the other trials. Evidence will be ex-
cluded if its probative value is outweighed by its tendency to unduly
protract the trial, to confuse the essential issue, or to inflame and pre-
judice the minds of the jurors against the defendant.91
Due to the lack of legislative standards for the admissibility of
evidence, the California Supreme Court has been compelled to fll the
gap. The California Court has held prejudicial: (1) the admission of
inflammatory evidence which could have been relevant only to re-
tribution for the enormity of the crime;9 2 (2) admission of evidence
offered to prove the relative efficacy of the death penalty as a deter-
rent to crime, or its social desirability, or its moral permissibility;9 3 (3)
an inquiry concerning the possibility that a defendant sentenced to life
imprisonment might be paroled.9 4 Although the exact scope of the
rule is unclear, generally any crime committed by the defendant,
whether or not resulting in a prior conviction, 5 may be proved in the
penalty proceeding.9 6
89People v. Hamilton, 82 Cal. Rptr. 4, 18, 388 P.2d 412, 426 (1963);
People v. Purvis, 52 Cal. 2d 871, 883, 346 P.2d 22, 29 (1959).
90 N.Y. PENAL LAw § 1045-a (McKinney 1967). (For a discussion of the
blanket admission of hearsay evidence, see Note, The Two-Trial System in Capital
Cases, supra note 80, at 63.)
91 See, e.g., People v. Purvis, 56 Cal.2d 93, 362 P.2d 713 (1961); See
generally C. McComcK, EVIDENCE chs. 16, 17 (1954).9 2 People v. Love, 53 Cal.2d 843, 350 P.2d 705 (1960).
93 People v. Lane, 56 Cal.2d 773, 366 P.2d 57 (1961); People v. Kidd, 56
Cal.2d 759, 366 P.2d 49 (1961).94 People v. Morse, 36 Cal. Rptr. 201, 388 P.2d 83 (1964).
9 5 Compare People v. Bentley, 58 Cal.2d 458, 374 P.2d 645 (1962), with
People v. Purvis, 52 Cal.2d 871, 346 P.2d 22 (1959). Such evidence must be
competent.
96 Under California decisions, the following have been held relevant: People
v. Corwin, 52 Cal.2d 404, 406, 340 P.2d 626, 627 (1959) (evidence that the
defendant after his apprehension had stated that he would kill the victim again
and would like to kill some others also); People v. Love, 53 Cal.2d 843, 853, 350
P.2d 705 711 (1960) (evidence that the defendant, a few years prior to the
crime and at a time when he was on parole, told a neighbor that he possessed a
gun); People v. Ketchel, 59 Cal.2d 503 541, 381 P.2d 894, 415 (1963) (evidence
of prior crimes to which defendant had confessed and the existence of which had
been corroborated by witnesses); People v. Purvis, 52 Cal.2d 871, 881, 346
P.2d 22, 27 (1959) (evidence of circumstances surrounding an earlier crime for
which defendant was convicted); People v. Griffin, 60 Cal.2d 129, 132, 383 P.2d
432, 436 (1963) (evidence of circumstances surrounding a crime for which the
defendant was acquitted). Pennsylvania limits evidence on the punishment issue
to the official record of prior convictions and the admissions and confessions of
(Continued on next page)
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When the issue of guilt is eliminated in penalty hearings, evi-
dentiary policies should be reexamined with regard to evidence rele-
vant to the purpose of the hearing-the imposition of the death penalty.
Revealing the full import of the defendant's record through admission
of evidence, not merely listing the categories of offenses committed, but
specifying the details of these offenses, will best enable a jury to de-
termine if execution of this defendant will serve to deter others, or if
it is deemed necessary to prevent the defendant himself from per-
petrating further killings.97
If the jury is unable to agree on the penalty to be imposed, all of
the bifurcated trial statutes provide the court with the power to dis-
charge the jury after a period of time it deems reasonable, and
"either impanel a new jury to determine the sentence or impose the
sentence of life imprisonment."98
If the second stage of the bifurcated trial procedure results in a
death verdict, the California statute provides for automatic review by
the California Supreme Court.9 9 This review extends both to the
determination of guilt and to the determination of penalty. Since the
two issues are separated, the court may reverse a judgment imposing
the death penalty without affecting the judgment of guilt. Assuming
no error occurred in the guilt phase of the trial, the conviction will be
aTirmed regardless of the disposition required by the judgment im-
posing the death penalty.100 The scope of review of the death
sentence is then limited to determining whether prejudicial error
occurred at the penalty trial. The California Court will not weigh the
evidence on the issue of punishment, even though it might doubt the
"appropriateness" of the death penalty in a particular case. If no pre-
judicial error occurred in the penalty phase of the trial, the judgment
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
the defendant. See Commonwealth v. McCoy, 405 Pa. 23, 172 A.2d 795 (1961);
Commonwealth v. Rucker, 403 Pa. 262, 168 A.2d 732 (1961).97 Note, Capital Punishment-The Issues And The Evidence, 6 THE CATHoLIc
LAwYER 269 (1960).
98 N.Y. PENeAL LAw § 1045-a (McKinney 1967); See also CAL. PENAL CODE
§ 190.1 (West 1957); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4701 (1959); CONN. GEN. STAT.
REv. § 939-53.10 (1963). Model Penal Code differs from this in that it auto-
matically provides for a sentence of life or less (at the court's discretion) when
the jury is unable to agree. MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(2) (Proposed Official
Draft 1962); See MODEL PENAL CODE § 606(1), which provides that the court
may sentence for term less than life. The Code proceeds on the assumption that
if twelve representative people cannot agree on the death penalty, the defendant
should receive life imprisonment.0 9 CAL. PENAL CODE § 190.1 (West 1957); See also N.Y. CODE CaMM. Pnoc.
517(1) which provides for an appeal to the court of appeals; see generally, Note,
Post-Conviction Remedies in California Death Penalty Cases, 11 STAN. L. REv.
94 (1958).
100 Note, The California Penalty Trial, supra note 66.
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will be affirmed,101 but if prejudicial error was present, the Court has
held that it may not reduce the death penalty to life imprisonment. It
must reverse the judgment imposing the death penalty and remand for
a new trial solely on the issue of punishment.10 2
The New York Statute provides another alternative-if error is
found in the second proceeding, the Court of Appeals will remand the
case to the trial court for a statute-directed imposition of life im-
prisonment.10 3 There are many problems inherent in remanding for
completely new penalty trials. One major disadvantage of a new trial
solely on the issue of punishment is that the new jury impaneled for
this purpose has not heard the evidence relating to the crime for which
the penalty is being determined. Thus, while only the penalty is
technically in issue (guilt having been conclusively established by the
affirmance of the conviction on appeal) the prosecution must repeat
most of the evidence introduced at the guilt phase of the prior trial.
The necessity of repeating this evidence adds appreciably to the
length of time required to retry the penalty issue.'04 The best solution
may be to remand to the trial court with the stipulation that the trial
court may in its discretion either impose life imprisonment or impanel
a new jury to determine the sentence. Another alternative would be to
empower the Court of Appeals to allow either a sentence for life or to
remand to the trial court for a new proceeding.10 5
Apparently, the desirability of providing the jury with ground
rules for their deliberations has not been recognized by the legislatures
or the courts with regard to the punishment under the bifurcated trial
statutes. 00 The New York Statute, which directs the jurors to reach a
unanimous verdict, has been interpreted as giving the jurors absolute
discretion to act according to their judgment and conscience. 07 This
approach is the same as that adopted by the California Courts. 08 The
101E.g., People v. Rittger, 54 Cal.2d 720, 355 P.2d 645 (1960); People
v. Cash, 52 Cal.2d 841, 345 P.2d 462 (1959); People v. Brust, 47 Cal.2d 776,
306 P.2d 480 (1957); People v. Odle, 37 Cal.2d 52, 230 P.2d 345 (1951).
102E.g., People v. Cash, 52 Cal.2d 841, 345 P.2d 462 (1959); People v.
Linden, 52 Cal.2d 1, 338 P.2d 397 (1959); See People v. Green, 47 Cal.2d 209,
235, 302 P.2d 307, 325 (1956).
103 On an appeal by the defendant where the judgment is death, the
court, ... if it finds substantial error only in the sentencing proceeding,
may set aside the sentence of death and remand the case to the trial court
in which event the trial court shall impose the sentence of life im-
prisonment. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1045-a. (McKinney 1967).
104 Note, The California Penalty Trial, supra note 66.
105 Note, The Two-Trial System In Capital Cases, supra note 80.
106 Id.
107People v. Dusablon, 16 N.Y.2d 9, 209 N.E.2d 90 (1965).
108 People v. Love, 53 Cal.2d 843, 853, 350 P.2d 705, 711 (1960); People v.
(Continued on next page)
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Model Penal Code takes a "categorical prerequisite" approach. 0 9
Under that approach, the Code sets up controls for discretionary
judgments, by enumerating a list of aggravating"0 and mitigating
circumstances"" and commands the jury (or court) not to "im-
pose . . . .sentence of death unless it finds one of the aggravating
circumstances . .. . and further finds that there are no mitigating
circumstances sufficiently substantial to call for leniency."" 2 The
Model Penal Code approach appears to be the better view although
it is a departure from the absolute discretion concept, it appears to be
a departure that is needed.
VII. CONCLUSION
There is no way to gloss over the brutality of capital punishment.
It is an imperfect penal device within an imperfect society. The ex-
termination of human life is enormously tragic whether it is a malicious
murder or a methodical execution. Yet as citizens of one community,
we must accept the evidence of reality as a guide and not give way to
deceiving idealistic fantasies disguised in the white shrouds of
righteousness. Being a rational society, it is imperative that we simply
weigh the interests in deciding whether capital punishment's service
to society outweighs its harshness to the deserving individual. If
through study and serious cogitation we find that it does, then with
the ends justified, we must provide a responsible means.
In the balance, capital punishment should be retained with the
bifurcated trial procedure as the best method of imposing a socially
useful punishment in every case. The evidence presented at the penalty
trial acquaints the jury with all the relevant information necessary for
an intelligent and rational determination of punishment. The states
now using this procedure have found the cost not to be prohibitive,
because the same jury can be used for the second proceeding, and the
balancing technique for admissibility of evidence is used at the penalty
stage so as not to unduly protract the trial.
(Footnote continued from preceding page)
Friend, 47 Cal.2d 749, 806 P.2d 463 (1957); People v. Green, 47 Cal.2d 209, 802
P.2d 807 (1956).
109 MoDE. PENAL CODE § 210.6 (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
110 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(8) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
II MODEL PENAL CODE: § 210.6(4) (Proposed Official Draft 1962).
112 MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.6(2) (1962); See also MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 201.6, Comments 3, 4 at 71, 72 (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959). For another approach,
whereby certain factors must be considered in the exercise of a "legal discretion"
to select either penalty, see Commonwealth v. Green, 836 Pa. 187, 151 A.2d 241(1959); Note, Scope of Appellate Review of Sentences in Capital Cases, 108
U. PA. L. REv. 484 (1960). Failure to consider those factors is an "abuse of dis-
cretion" subject to appellate review.
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The bifurcated trial procedure decreases substantially the chances
of sentencing an undeserving citizen to death. The term "undeserving"
is used to designate defendants who cannot be classified as being what
Governor Di Salle called "pathological incorrigibles."
Capital punishment should be retained in Kentucky. However, this
severe penal reprimand should be closely accompanied by the most
efficient and equitable procedural device available, which is the bi-
furcated trial procedure. Perhaps if such an apparatus is provided for
death sentencing in Kentucky, the opponents of capital punishment
will be justifiably less pertinacious in their protest. For then the dignity
of human life will be respected even in its taking and the awesome
price that is rendered will not be paid in vain.
Charles E. Glasscock
